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Logic and Theology in Clement of Alexandria. 
The Purpose of the 8th Book of the Stromata
by Silke-Petra Bergjan
Logic on the one hand and theology on the other, science and faith, method 
and dogma seem to imply an opposition or at least a certain tension. By 
the 4th century this opposition was well established. Athanasius has several 
educated Greeks visit Antonius. They look there for their syllogisms and 
dialectical arguments, they are caught up in sophistical logomac…a1, they 
labor at needless proofs, but they are confronted by the effective and pow-
erful faith of Antonius. Faith and dialectics are understood as alternatives 
that exclude one another. “Is it through demonstration by arguments or the 
working of faith? And which is more important”2? Antonius, who needs 
an interpreter even to speak to these philosophers, calls faith superior and 
more powerful, syllogisms ultimately superfl uous. The opposition between 
the Christian and the philosophers is reduced to the opposition between 
belief and dialectics. In the background is the ideal of the simple, plain 
Christian, who does without education and sophistical subtleties. In Gre-
gory of Nyssa, the same pattern interrupts his conversation with Makrina: 
“Now to confi rm our doctrine according to dialectical method by syllogistic 
and analytic techniques is a species of discourse from which we ask to be 
excused, for it is an unsound and questionable way of establishing truth”3. 
Her words ring true, according to Gregory and for him it stems from her 
use of plain language. A third and last example is found in Eusebius of 
Caesarea. He outlines the heresy of Paul of Samosata and refers in this 
context even more specifi cally to dialectics. Among various accusations, 
he condemns Paul of Samosata with the following words: “They have set 
aside the rule of ancient faith […]; and if any one brings before them a 
1 Ath., v. Anton. 78,2 (SC 400, 334,9 Bartelink).
2 Ath., v. Anton. 77,3 (332,9-11 B.): di' ¢pode…xewj lÒgwn À di' ™nerge…aj p…stewj; kaˆ tˆ 
presbÚterÒn ™stin, ¹ di' ™nerge…aj p…stij À ¹ di¦ lÒgwn ¢pÒdeixij. Cf. v. Anton. 77,6 
(332,20-22 B.): éste belt…wn kaˆ Ñcurwtšra ¹ di¦ p…stewj ™nšrgeia tîn sofistikîn Ømîn 
sullogismîn.
3 Gr. Nyss., anim. et res., (PG 46, 52B-C Migne): tÕ m{n oân kat¦ t¾n dialektik¾n tšcnhn 
di¦ sullogistikÁj te kaˆ ¢nalutikÁj ™pist»mhj bebaioàsqai kaˆ t¦ ¹mštera dÒgmata, æj 
saqrÒn te kaˆ Ûpopton e„j ¢pÒdeixin ¢lhqe…aj tÕ toioàton e"doj toà lÒgou paraithsÒmeqa. 
[…] ¢kat£skeuÒn te kaˆ gumnÕn p£shj peribolÁj pros…oito lÒgon.
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passage of Divine Scripture, they see whether a conjunctive or disjunctive 
form of syllogism can be made from it. They forsake the holy writings of 
God to devote themselves to geometry […]. Euclid is laboriously meas-
ured by some of them; and Aristotle and Theophrastus are admired; and 
Galen, perhaps, by some is even worshipped”4. Thus Eusebius introduces 
as a further element the notion of heresy. From Apelles to Apollinaris, the 
knowledge and use of logic was a sign of their heresy. The use of dialectic 
methods and formal argumentation was part of the intensive debate of 
the ideas of Aetius and Eunomius5. I leave this debate aside as well as the 
question of to what extent the ideal of simple and plain faith that illustrates 
itself through its opposition to dialectic subtleties was a commonplace that 
had already changed its signifi cance by the 4th century. 
The opposition between the plain faith of simple Christians and the 
needless distinctions of dialectics was known in the times of Clement, as 
can be seen in Athenagoras6. Here, we encounter the uneducated crafts-
men and old women, who are not in a position to explain their faith with 
words, but whose lives give ample evidence of it. Distinguished men such as 
Athanasius, Gregory, Eusebius and Athenagoras identifi ed themselves with 
that form of Christianity. Not Clement. He mentions that there is no need 
to polish his writing according to elevated standards of refi ned language7, 
but he does not identify with those Christians who regard deep education 
in philosophy, art and science as needless and prefer simplicity instead. 
Moreover, dissatisfaction with the presentation of Christian thought at 
the time, especially the lack of refl ection on method, in particular basic 
knowledge of the elements of proof or of science, could explain why he 
wrote and published the Stromata. Similar reasons probably led Galen to 
write his work on proofs8. Galen mentions methodlessness and fear of 
method among his medical colleagues9. They were not trained in apodeictic 
4 Eus., h.e. V 28,13f. (GCS Eusebius 2/1, 504,11-21 Schwartz): p…stewj d{ ¢rca…aj kanÒna 
ºqet»kasi […] k¨n aÙto‹j prote…nV tij _htÕn grafÁj qe#kÁj, ™xet£zousin pÒteron sunhmmšnon 
À diezeugmšnon dÚnatai poiÁsai scÁma sullogismoà: katalipÒntej d{ t¦j ¡g…aj toà qeoà 
graf£j, gewmetr…an ™pithdeÚousin […]. EÙkle…dhj goàn par£ tisin aÙtîn filopÒnwj 
gewmetre‹tai, 'Aristotšlhj d{ kaˆ QeÒfrastoj qaum£zontai: GalhnÕj g¦r ‡swj ØpÒ tinwn 
kaˆ proskune‹tai.
5 Cf. Socr., h.e. II 35,6-14 (GCS NF. 1, 150,18-151,17 Hansen), Soz., h.e. III 15,7; IV 12,1; 
VI 26,3 (GCS 50, 126,24-27; 154,16-18; 272,25-273,2 Bidez/Hansen). On “Aristotle’s 
association with heretical thought” cf. D.T. Runia, Festugière Revisited. Aristotle in the 
Greek Patres, VigChr 43, 1989, 23-26. Cf. p. 3 on Festugières shortcomings: “The range 
of Aristotelian doctrine in which Festugière declares the Fathers to be interested in is 
too restricted. The three themes he concentrates on are certainly the most common, but 
there are many others notably also in the area of logic and dialectics”.
6 Athenag., leg. 11,2 (PTS 31, 42,10-43,19 Marcovich).
7 Clem., str. I 48,5 (GCS Clemens Alexandrinus 3, 31,31-32,1 Stählin/Früchtel).
8 Cf. I. von Müller, Über Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis, ABAW.PP 20/2, 
München 1895, 414.
9 Gal., libr. ord. 1,9 (Medicorum Graecorum opera quae exstant 19, 52 Kühn = CUFr, 
Galien 1, 90,7-13 Boudon), cf. von Müller, Über Galens Werk (see note 9), 415.419.
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methods and either avoided them or believed themselves to have innate 
powers to make diagnoses10.
Clement probably had similar complaints against untutored teachers 
of Christianity, but he was reluctant to identify either himself or his op-
ponents with the logicians. Clement found himself confronted with two 
kinds of opponents. He characterizes them as those who insist on the 
simple and plain nature of Christian faith, and those who like to create 
strife and doubt by splitting hairs. Clement’s Stromata can be seen as 
directed against both groups. Even though one can speak of a decline 
of logic, logic was still taught. Galen lists the schools of philosophy that 
he visited, and even though he was largely disappointed in the quality 
of instruction in logic, his remarks still attest to an ongoing debate on 
dialectical problems11. It is therefore likely that traces of this debate were 
adapted to confront opponents in various other contexts. Clement was 
not the only Christian writer to do so. Similarities in approach can be 
seen in the de resurrectione-genre of literature, for example in the writing 
attributed to Athenagoras12. However, that author used a distinctly less 
technical language, and his knowledge as refl ected in his description of 
¢pÒdeixij is limited. The knowledge of logic and epistemology, the scope 
and precision of the 8th Book of the Stromata seems to have been an ex-
ception in the 2nd century. This text deserves our attention. 
I. The 8th Book of the Stromata
The 8th book differs signifi cantly from the previous Stromata in content 
and length. Harnack13 gave a summary of the main points that have to 
be taken into consideration. Ancient sources14 testify that eight books of 
the Stromata existed, but also that manuscripts with seven books were in 
circulation. As handed down to us, the text of the 8th book is not com-
plete. It is a matter of debate whether the 8th book goes back to Clement 
in its present form, or whether a compiler assembled excerpts of a more 
comprehensive version15. Both explanations leave questions open. The text 
10 Cf. von Müller, Über Galens Werk (see note 8), 418.
11 The following list of Gal., libr. propr. 14 (Medicorum Graecorum opera quae exstant 
19, 39-45 Kühn = CUFr, Galien 1, 164-169 Boudon) is referred to by J. Barnes, Proof 
Destroyed, in: M. Schofi eld/B. Myles/J. Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies 
in Hellenistic Epistemology, Oxford, 1980, 162 note 2.
12 Athenag., res. 1,14 (SVigChr 53, 38,16-26 Marcovich). 
13 A. von Harnack, Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius, vol. 1, Leipzig 
21958, 315.
14 Phot., bibl. 111 (Photius, Bibliothèque, texte établi et traduit par R. Henry, CBy, vol. 2, 
Paris 1960, 81f.).
15 Cf. P. Nautin, La Fin des Stromates et les Hypostases de Clément d’Alexandrie, VigChr 
30, 1976, 268-302. 
 Logic and Theology in Clement of Alexandria 399
of the extant 8th book is coherent with the preceding seven Stromata. The 
links between them are obvious and have long been observed16. If the 8th 
book consists of excerpts, then it is diffi cult to explain why the defi nitions 
that Clement gives in the 8th book were already used in the preceding ones. 
If, on the other hand, the 8th book consists of notes that Clement made 
from handbooks or lectures, then his sources must have been compatible 
to a remarkable degree with the material in the preceding books. If one 
compares the 8th book with the extant logical handbooks of Galen or 
Apuleius on logic, or with corresponding chapters in the handbook of 
Alcinous, the differences are striking. 
What roughly corresponds to the 8th book are the subdivisions of logic 
listed by Alcinous or Sextus Empiricus, namely division, defi nition, analysis, 
induction, and syllogism. 
Clement’s aim is to fi nd scientifi c knowledge or ™pisthmonik¾ qewr…a17, 
where ™pist»mh is understood as being organized into a system of proofs or 
demonstrations. That calls for the study of method, and this leads Clement 
fi rst of all to questions of semantics, to the distinction between sound and 
meaningful language18, between words, meaning, and things signifi ed. His 
purpose here is to clarify the terms used in setting forth a matter of dispute. 
Proof or demonstration aims for scientifi c, clear and certain knowledge, 
based on pre-existing knowledge. Demonstration being understood as 
discourse, the example is presented by an interlocutor, a protagonist of 
doubt, and this naturally leads into a chapter on the Pyrrhonian suspension 
of judgement. Questions of tense logic and future contingent statement are 
touched upon. A second part is dedicated to questions of defi nitions and 
classifi cation. These lead again to semantic questions, and in this context 
Clement paraphrases sections of the Categoriae of Aristotle. Clement uses 
an example that appears in the Categoriae, and others that are found in 
the later commentaries by Porphyrius, Ammonius or Simplicius19. Even 
though in a list of main fi gures of the arts and sciences, Clement ascribes 
logic to Chrysipp and the natural sciences to Aristotle, Aristotle seems to 
be his principal source for logic20. Finally we have a chapter on causes.
16 Cf. W. Ernst, De Clementis Alexandrini Stromatum libro VIII. qui fertur, Göttingen 1910, 
passim.
17 Clem., str. VIII 1,3 (80,13 F.). 
18 Clem., str. VIII 12,7 (87,19-22 F.): tÕ kuoÚmenon aÙtÕ d¾ toàto toÜnoma pantˆ dÁlon 
Óti m»te zùÒn ™sti m»te futÒn. ¢ll' Ônom£ te kaˆ fwn¾ kaˆ sîma kaˆ ×n kaˆ tˆ kaˆ p£nta 
m©llon À zùon. (“It is plain to everybody that the name ‘foetus’ is neither an animal not 
a plant, but a name, and a sound, and a body, and a being, and anything and everything 
rather than an animal.”) 
19 Cf. R. Sorabji, The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, in: R. Sorabij (ed.), Aristotle 
Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Infl uence, Ithaca (New York) 1990, 
1-30.
20 Clem., str. VII 101,4 (71,18 F.). For a survey of Aristotelian logic see J. Barnes, art. 
Logic, I. The Peripatetics, in: K. Algra/J. Barnes/J. Mansfeld/M. Schofi eld (eds.), The 
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When one compares the 8th book with handbooks of logic such as 
Galen’s Institutio Logica and Apuleius’ Perˆ ˜rmhne…aj, the most striking 
difference is that in Clement the exposition of syllogisms is missing. One 
could conjecture that Clement presented syllogisms in one of the missing 
sections, but it is likely that in Clement there was never a chapter on the 
syllogistic fi gures. Only the fi rst sentences of the Institutio Logica have 
parallels in Clement. Galen writes: “The fi nding of things known through 
demonstration comes from things already known […] from knowledge 
of things that are proper to what is sought to be demonstrated”21. This 
conception of knowledge-building leads Galen to an exhaustive study of 
the technicalities of syllogisms. The little that Clement says on syllogisms 
will be our subject now.
II. Demonstrative versus Dialectical Syllogisms
At the start of the 3rd chapter of the Stromata Clement gives the following 
defi nition of demonstration (¢pÒdeixij): “Demonstration is an argument 
that in controversial questions provides certainty that rests upon points 
of agreement”22. Agreement on fi rst principles that are not themselves in 
question carries over to the certainty of the conclusion. Clement is interested 
in the relationship between ¢pÒdeixij and these fundamental principles, 
between scientifi c knowledge and its specifi c certainty and reliability. He 
develops this in the 2nd and 3rd chapter of the 8th book which will be com-
mented on in the following in three sections.
II.1. Demonstration as Method of Discovery or of Instruction
Clement looks for knowledge that can be won by a process of rational 
and illuminating discovery, he speaks of gnîsij, of an investigation that 
leads to certain knowledge, he speaks of ™pist»mh and scientifi c demon-
stration. Through scientifi c demonstration he wants to gain knowledge. 
He understands ™pist»mh as being organized into a system of proofs or 
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge 1999, 65-83; R. Smith, art. 
Logic, in: J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge 1995, 23-
65; I. Mueller, Stoic and Peripatetic Logic, AGPh 51, Berlin 1969, 173-187; M. Frede, 
Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic, AGPh 56, 1974, 1-32; D.M. Gabbay/J. Woods (eds.), 
Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 1, Amsterdam 2004.
21 Gal., inst. log. 1,2 (Galenus, Institutio logica, ed. K. Kalbfl eisch, Leipzig 1896, 3,6-9): 
(de‹ d{ tîn di' ¢pode…xewj gignwskomšnwn) ™k progignwskomšnwn e"nai t¾n eÛresin […] ™k 
tîn o„ke…wn <tù> ¢podeicthsomšnJ. Translation by J.S. Kiefer, Galen’s Institutio Logica. 
English Translation, introduction, and commentary, Baltimore 1964, 31.
22 Clem., str. VIII 5,1 (82,12-14 F.): æsaÚtwj d{ kaˆ t¾n ¢pÒdeixin p£ntej ¥nqrwpoi Ðmolo-
g»saien <¨n> lÒgon e"nai to‹j ¢mfisbhtoumšnoij ™k tîn Ðmologoumšnwn ™kpor…zonta t¾n 
p…stin.
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23 Clem., str. VIII 2,2 (80,17-20 F.): oÙ g¦r eØre‹n m{n oŒÒn te, m¾ zhtÁsai dš: oÙd{ zhtÁsai 
mšn, oÙcˆ d{ ™reun»sasqai: oÙd{ diereun»sasqai mšn, oÙcˆ d{ diaptÚxai kaˆ ¢napet£sai di' 
™rwt»sewj e„j saf»neian ¥gonta tÕ zhtoÚmenon.
24 Cf. S.E., M. VIII (BSGRT, Sexti Empirici Opera 2, 104-212 Mutschmann); cp. J. Brun-
schwig, Proof Defi ned, in: Schofi eld/Myles/Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism (see 
note 11), 126.
25 S.E., P. II 135 (BSGRT Pyrroneion hypotyposeon libros tres continens, editionem stereo-
typam emendatam curavit addenda et corrigenda adiecit I. Mau, Leipzig 1958, 98).
26 Arist., APo. 71a1f. (SCBO, 114 Ross): p©sa didaskal…a kaˆ p©sa m£qhsij dianohtik¾ ™k 
proãparcoÚshj g…netai gnèsewj. English translation: The Complete Works of Aristotle, 
ed. by J. Barnes, vol. 1, Princeton 1984, used in the following. On the paedagogical 
context of demonstration in Aristotle see J. Barnes, Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration, 
Phronesis 14, 1969, (123-152) 137-147.
27 Clem., str. VIII 5,3 (82,16f. F.): ¢pÒdeixij lšgetai ¹ t¾n ™pisthmonik¾n p…stin ™ntiqe‹sa 
ta‹j tîn manqanÒntwn yuca‹j.
demonstrations. A demonstration needs a clear method. The starting point 
Clement refers to in the context of instruction, has to be the most basic 
one to be generally agreed upon.
Right from the beginning two lines of thought are visible. Clement’s 
language of search, investigation, and examination suggests that ¢pÒdeixij 
is a research-technique and that Clement is describing a process that results 
in knowledge of something previously not known. “It is impossible to fi nd 
without seeking, to seek without examining, to examine without unfolding 
and opening the question by inquiry, to produce clarity”23. Here, Clement 
seems to indicate that the process of ¢pÒdeixij reveals something new, as 
is indicated by the term “illumination” to describe the kind of search he 
has in mind. So far, I have emphasized points that can also be read in 
Sextus Empiricus where he deals with demonstration. Sextus also assigns 
¢pÒdeixij to the genus of lÒgoj24, and characterizes demonstration as an 
argument which is revelatory and establishes a non-evident conclusion25. 
Demonstration describes a process that brings something hidden to light, a 
process of discovery. Clement describes the discoverer as only thinking that 
he does not know something. The knowledge has only to be revealed, and 
this happens through the force of a premiss that compels the conclusion. 
However, there is a second interpretation of demonstration. 
Here, the knowledge exists already and demonstration is a form of pres-
entation in a pedagogical context. This puts in mind us of the fi rst sentence 
of the Analytica posterior: “All teaching and all intellectual learning comes 
about from already known knowledge“26. Not only does Clement use the 
same phrase for pre-existing knowledge, but he, too, identifi es the principle 
of demonstration with the principle of instruction. He speaks about “Apo-
deixis or more precisely scientifi c certainty (™pisthmonik¾n p…stin) in the 
souls of those who learn“27.  'ApÒdeixij becomes the task of the teacher, as 
“we come to know things by taking not just any random terms, but such as 
are prior and more familiar, as is done in demonstrations – for so it is with 
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all teaching and learning28”, to quote Aristotle. The commentaries show 
that there was a debate on whether to emphasize the context of teaching 
or not29. We see this in a quote from Simplicius that also serves to set the 
stage for our next point: Simplicius states: “all discursive teaching and 
learning comes about from fi rst principles [...] everything known is either 
self-evident and a fi rst principle of knowledge through being agreed as is in 
the case with defi nitions and the premisses that are called immediate, or it 
is through some prior knowledge of defi nitions and immediate premisses, 
as is the case with everything known through syllogism and demonstra-
tion”30. What are these fi rst principles according to Clement?
II.2. Admissible Starting Points for Demonstrations
There are three attempts in Clement to describe what can be admitted as 
a premiss. First and most important seems his insistence on starting with 
something agreed upon. Clement uses the term ÐmologoÚmenon31. But what 
sorts of things are agreed upon? Clement refers to defi nitions and more 
generally to statements that are certain and evident. By certain and evident, 
Clement means dialectical propositions that have achieved a high degree 
of credibility through being commonly held. Similarly, in the quotation 
just given, Simplicius32 associates certainty with agreement.
A matter of dispute must be resolved in light of agreed upon, clear and 
distinct propositions. “Agreed-upon” implies that the starting point has to 
be set and decided on33. Clement’s purpose is to avoid the infi nite regress. 
He rejects a search for fi rst principles in which every point of dispute re-
quires the resolution of the next even more fundamental one, and so on. 
This infi nite process would prevent a proof from being started. Sextus uses 
exactly this argument repeatedly in favour of Scepticism; and concludes 
that since the need for proof never ends, but continues ad infi nitum there 
is nothing that can ever be proven34. Instead, according to Clement, the 
basis of a demonstration has to be agreed upon, that is, ÐmologoÚmenon 
says that the fi rst principles have to be posited and confi rmed35. 
28 Arist., Top. 141a28-30 (SCBO, 120 Ross): gnwr…zomen d' oÙk ™k tîn tucÒntwn ¢ll' ™k tîn 
protšrwn kaˆ gnwrimwtšrwn, kaq£per ™n ta‹j ¢pode…xesin (oÛtw g¦r p©sa didaskal…a kaˆ 
m£qhsij œcei). 
29 Alex. Aphr., in Top. I 1 (CAG 2/2, 9,22 Wallies).
30 Simp., in Ph. I 1 (CAG 8, 15,1f.; 15,5-8 Diels): e„ g¦r p©sa didaskal…a kaˆ p©sa m£qhsij 
dianohtik¾ ™x ¢rcîn g…netai […] ™peid¾ p©n tÕ ginwskÒmenon À aÙtÒpistÒn ™sti kaˆ ¢rc¾ 
gnèsewj di¦ tÕ Ðmologe‹sqai, æj œcousin oƒ Óroi kaˆ aƒ ¥mesoi kaloÚmenai prot£seij, À ™k 
proãparcoÚshj tinÕj ginèsketai gnèsewj tÁj tîn Órwn kaˆ tîn ¢mšswn prot£sewn, æj 
œcei p£nta t¦ di¦ sullogismîn kaˆ ¢pode…xewj ginwskÒmena. 
31 Clem., str. VIII 4,1 (81,30 F.).
32 Simp., in Ph. I 1 (15,1-25 D.).
33 Cf. Alex. Aphr., in Top. I 1 (7f. W.).
34 S.E., P. III 44; II 182 (145; 110 M.).
35 Clem., str. VIII 5,1 (82,12-14 F.).
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The concept of “agreed-upon assumptions” occurs in the defi nition 
given by Sextus: “A proof, they say, is an argument which, by way of 
agreed-upon assumptions and in virtue of yielding a conclusion, reveals a 
non-obvious consequence”36. Sextus draws upon the defi nition due to his 
opponents, identifi ed as Stoics. Aristotle and his commentators, on the 
other hand, rarely cite agreement as a criterion, but there are exceptions 
like: “He begins with what is more obvious and agreed upon”37 or “as 
in demonstration, will he make it clear from what is agreed upon”38. The 
examples come from Ammonius and Aristotle, and we can fi nd this phrase 
used by the commentators beginning with Alexander of Aphrodisias. Even 
in Galen an example of this pattern can be found. 
Second: while Clement initially identifi es agreement as a safe starting 
point, he continues and in the very next paragraph he sets in opposition 
the true and the agreed upon. Here the starting point for a demonstration 
is not merely an agreed-upon assumption, but instead a true proposition 
or, in modern terms, the valid versus the sound argument. In this context 
the agreed-upon assumption slips over to the side of the merely valid 
argument39. 
Finally, in a third attempt to defi ne the starting point, the reference to 
the agreed-upon assumptions is missing all together. Here the starting points 
of demonstrations are seen as self-evident, without need of proof. Clement 
refers to the philosophers, who call them indemonstrable, ¢napÒdeikton40. 
Scientifi c knowledge must be built upon indemonstrable fi rst principles, 
which are therefore primary immediate propositions. The alternative, that 
everything needs a proof, would make demonstration impossible and would 
again lead to an infi nite regress. At this point, Clement has used the same 
argument twice with somewhat different conclusions. Clement admits not 
only self-evident premisses, but also those that are evident to perception 
and intellect. These are considered simple and irrefutable or simple, rational 
and primary, respectively. Whether self-evident or evident to perception 
or intellect, they are previously known. All these principles are suitable as 
premisses only if they are appropriately relevant to the conclusion. If one 
36 S.E., P. II 135 (98 M.): œstin oân, æj fas…n, ¹ ¢pÒdeixij lÒgoj di' Ðmologoumšnwn lhmm£twn 
kat¦ sunagwg¾n ™pifor¦n ™kkalÚptwn ¥dhlon. Translated by: J. Annas/J. Barnes, Sextus 
Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge 1994. Cf. S.E., P. II 143; II 170.
37 Ammon., in Cat. (CAG 4/4, 97,20 Reimer): kaˆ ¥rcetai ¢pÕ toà safestšrou kaˆ Ðmolo-
goumšnou. Translated by: S. Marc Cohen/G.B. Matthews, Ammonius. On Aristotle Cat-
egories, London 1991, 118.
38 Arist., APo. 92a35f. (164 R.): oÜte g¦r æj ¢podeiknÝj ™x Ðmologoumšnwn e"nai dÁlon 
poi»sei. 
39 Clem., str. VIII 6,2 (83,1-6 F.).
40 Clem., str. VIII 7,1f. (83,20-24 F.): aÙt…ka oƒ filÒsofoi ¢napode…ktouj Ðmologoàsi t¦j 
tîn Ólwn ¢rc£j. ést' e‡per ™stˆn ¢pÒdeixij, ¢n£gkh p©sa prÒteron e"na… ti pistÕn ™x 
˜autoà, Ö d¾ prîton kaˆ ¢napÒdeikton lšgetai. ™pˆ t¾n ¢napÒdeikton ¥ra p…stin ¹ p©sa 
¢pÒdeixij ¢n£getai.
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adds up all the aspects mentioned by Clement, one arrives at the following 
list: premisses should be true, evident, agreed upon, relevant, previously 
known. Admirable as it is, this list shows a certain lack of coherence. The 
criterion of being agreed upon versus the criterion of being evident suggests 
that different conceptions have been mixed together.
Most important are thirdly the various distinctions Clement draws to 
explain the difference between syllogism and ¢pÒdeixij.
II.3. The Distinction between Demonstration and Syllogism
Clement does not use the terms sullogismÒj/sullog…zesqai right from the 
beginning but introduces them later41 to refer to the distinction between 
a valid and a sound conclusion where ¢pÒdeixij refers to a sound conclu-
sion42. In a fi rst line of argument Clement explains that in contrast to a 
conclusion from just one premiss (œndeixij) a syllogism consists of several 
parts including at least two premisses. The example he gives to illustrate 
the structure of a syllogism does not meet our expectations at all. He gives 
an historical example, the legend of Python of Byzantium43, whose act 
of betrayal was established by more than one piece of evidence, without 
any elucidation of the logical structure of the argument44. The example 
serves merely to illustrate an argument that rests on several supports, 
in contrast to the demonstration understood as indication (œndeixij) and 
thereby as a one-to-one principle45. What are the antecedents for Clement’s 
notion of œndeixij? One could refer to the debate on the Stoic admission 
of syllogisms with only one premiss46. This debate seems to be of some 
importance to Clement as he later refers in Stoic terms to the distinction 
between syllogisms and arguments that are valid but not syllogistically 
concludent (perantikÕj lÒgoj)47. Considerably closer to Clement at this 
point however is the Aristotelian concept of a proof based on irrefutable 
signs, which was accepted as a kind of demonstration, though an inferior 
one. Clement’s example of œndeixij (pregnant women)48 corresponds exactly 
to this concept, which was discussed in the context of induction. Later 
Clement returns to the structure of syllogism and summarizes: “Nobody 
would call a syllogism simple or primary, even if the conclusion is true, as 
41 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,27 F.).
42 On defi nitions of proof (¢pÒdeixij) cf. Brunschwig, Proof Defi ned (see note 24), 125-160; 
Barnes, Proof Destroyed (see note 11), 161-181.
43 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,30 F.). Cf. Plu., Dem. 9,849f. (BSGRT, 10,7 Ziegler).
44 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,29-83,1 F.).
45 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,27-29 F.).
46 Alexander of Aphrodisias for example rejected this form of argument: Alex. Aphr., in 
APr. I 1 (CAG 2/2, 21,28-22,1 Wiels).
47 Clem., str. VIII 8,2 (84,19f. F.).
48 Clem., str. VIII 6,1 (82,28f. F.).
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a syllogism consists of three parts, two premisses and the conclusion”49. 
In deed, the notion of “primary” leads us into Clement’s second and more 
successful attempt to defi ne the terms demonstration and syllogism. Asser-
tions are called primary if they are unmediated and indemonstrable, and it 
is exactly those syllogisms drawn from primary premisses that are called 
demonstrations in the Peripatetic tradition. Clement builds upon different 
well known criteria to distinguish various forms of syllogisms. Accord-
ing to Clement, demonstration is defi ned as drawing a conclusion from a 
self-evident, indemonstrable, but above all true premiss, while syllogizing 
is defi ned as drawing a conclusion from agreed-upon assumptions, that 
is, from premisses that are not necessarily known to be true. If you draw 
an appropriate (o„ke‹on) conclusion from premisses that are not known to 
be true, but entail the conclusion, you still produce a syllogism; however, 
Clement explains, you don’t produce a demonstration, while if you don’t 
draw an appropriate conclusion, you don’t produce a syllogism at all50. 
This grading of ¢pÒdeixij, syllogism and non-syllogism, we would call a 
sound conclusion, a valid one and an invalid one. In the terminology of 
Clement, syllogism refers to a valid or invalid inference, while ¢pÒdeixij, 
refers exclusively to a sound proof.
His distinction between sound, valid and invalid depends partly on 
the characteristics of the premisses, partly on the appropriateness of the 
relationship between premisses and conclusion. Beyond this, formal criteria 
for establishing validity are not visible. As can be seen from his applica-
tion of logic in his theological works, the relationship between premiss 
and conclusion is in Clement not independent of content and not topic 
neutral. 
Clement’s explanation of the distinction between demonstration and 
syllogism is closely related to that given by Aristotle. In the introduction 
to the Topic Aristotle states “now a syllogism is an argument in which, 
certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily 
comes about through them. It is a demonstration, when the premisses 
from which the deduction starts are true and primary, or are such that 
our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses that are 
primary and true; and a dialectical syllogism, if it reasons from reputable 
opinions. Things are true and primary that are convincing on the strength 
not of anything else but of themselves”51. Clement’s distinction at this 
49 Clem., str. VIII 6,6 (83,12-15 F.): oÙdeˆj d{ ¡ploàj kaˆ prîtoj lÒgoj Ñnom£zetai sul-
logismÒj, k¨n ¢lhq¾j Ï, ¢ll' œsti toÙl£ciston ™k triîn toioÚtwn sÚnqeton, due‹n m{n æj 
lhmm£twn, ˜nÕj d{ æj sumper£smatoj. 
50 Clem., str. VIII 6,3f. (83,6-10 F.). 
51 Arist., Top. 100a25-100b19 (1 R.): œsti d¾ sullogismÕj lÒgoj ™n ú teqšntwn tinîn ›terÒn 
ti tîn keimšnwn ™x ¢n£gkhj sumba…nei di¦ tîn keimšnwn. ¢pÒdeixij m{n oân ™stin, Ótan ™x 
¢lhqîn kaˆ prètwn Ð sullogismÕj Ï, À ™k toioÚtwn § di£ tinwn prètwn kaˆ ¢lhqîn tÁj 
perˆ aÙt¦ gnèsewj t¾n ¢rc¾n e‡lhfen, dialektikÕj d{ sullogismÕj Ð ™x ™ndÒxwn sullogizÒ-
menoj. œsti d{ ¢lhqÁ m{n kaˆ prîta t¦ m¾ di' ˜tšrwn ¢ll¦ di' aØtîn œconta t¾n p…stin. 
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point is essentially identical to Aristotle’s. The opposition between true 
and primary premisses and premisses based on opinion is spelled out in 
the commentaries. Alexander of Aphrodisias writes: “For demonstrating 
something is not the same thing as giving a syllogism, for the latter is 
based on what someone thought or assented to. For many false things are 
assented to, on the basis of which a syllogism, but not a demonstration, 
can be produced”52. He seems to refer to the same fundamental difference 
between syllogism and demonstration. 
Clement identifi es the Aristotelian defi nition of dialectical syllogism 
with syllogisms in general, and uses the Aristotelian criteria to distinguish 
between syllogisms and demonstration. What is misleading in Clement 
at this point is that he has not yet mentioned that this distinction is in 
Aristotelian terms a distinction between two subclasses of syllogisms. 
Both, demonstrations and dialectical syllogisms, are syllogisms, but not 
every syllogism is a demonstration, as the later requires true hypotheses. 
In the Peripatetic tradition, though there is a clear distinction between 
syllogism and demonstration, a demonstration is still called a syllogism. 
This is obvious in Aristotle53 and most clearly spelled out by Alexander 
of Aphrodisias stating: “For if there is a demonstration, there must be a 
syllogism, since a demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but if there is a 
syllogism, there need not to be a demonstration because there are also 
dialectical and sophistical syllogisms”54. An argument in the form of a 
demonstration was basically understood as a syllogism. 
The distinction Clement describes was convincing and well known, 
but his attempt to separate demonstration and syllogism as far as possible 
provokes the objection that both demonstration and dialectical syllogism 
are syllogisms. In response to this Clement turns to a Stoic line of thought 
where he fi nds the needed distinction between two valid conclusions one 
a syllogism and the other not syllogistically concludent55.
In this third attempt to defi ne a proper argumentation Clement intro-
duces the distinction between analysis and demonstration, analysis being 
the reduction of a given proposition to a indemonstrable fi rst principle 
(e„j t¦ ™x ˜autîn pist£) and demonstration being the presentation of the 
52 Alex. Aphr., in APr. (292,32-34 W.): oÙ g¦r taÙtÕn ¢pode‹xa… te kaˆ sullog…sasqa… ti, 
diÒti œdoxš tini À sunecèrhse: sugcwre‹tai g¦r poll¦ kaˆ yeudÁ, di' ïn sullogismÕj m{n 
¨n gšnoito, ¢pÒdeixij d{ oÜ. Translated by: I. Mueller, Alexander of Aphrodosias: On 
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics I,23-31, London 2006, 77.
53 Arist., APo. 72a25f. (116 R.): ™peˆ d{ de‹ pisteÚein te kaˆ e„dšnai tÕ pr©gma tù toioàton 
œcein sullogismÕn Ön kaloàmen ¢pÒdeixin.
54 Alex. Aphr., in APr. prooemium (7,5-9 W.): ¢pode…xewj m{n g¦r oÜshj p£ntwj œsti kaˆ 
sullogismÒj: ¹ g¦r ¢pÒdeixij sullogismÒj tij: sullogismoà d{ Ôntoj oÙ p£ntwj œstin 
¢pÒdeixij di¦ tÕ sullogismÕn e"nai kaˆ dialektikÒn tina kaˆ sofistikÒn. Translated by: J. 
Barnes/S. Bobzien/K. Flannery/K. Ierodiakonou, Alexander of Aphrodosias: On Aris-
totle’s Prior Analytics I,1-7, Ithaca (New York) 1991, 49.
55 D.L., vit. V 78,5 (BSGRT, 362 Marcovich).
 Logic and Theology in Clement of Alexandria 407
completed argumentation including all intermediate steps56. He urges the 
reader fi rst to look for true propositions as a foundation, regardless of 
whether they are called premiss, assumption or axiom. Defi ning a demon-
stration as an argument that establishes one thing from another, he next 
asks his reader to make sure to draw the appropriate conclusion without 
caring very much whether an argument is called concludent (but not syl-
logistically concludent)57 or is syllogistically concludent. The terminology 
taken up shows that in this section, without leaving his line of thought 
Clement hints at the Stoic perspective on logic58. 
What we fi nd in Clement is completely standard and refers to basic 
ideas of logic. Clement uses logical distinctions and vocabulary, and even 
his preference for ¢pÒdeixij over syllogism in general was shared by phi-
losophers. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotle “tells us that 
the account of demonstration must be considered the primary product of 
syllogistic method as a whole. For the study of the other forms of syl-
logism is a matter for philosophers only to the extent that dealing with 
them is useful for demonstration and for the discovery of what is true”59. 
Clement’s search for truth seems compatible with the primacy of ¢pÒdeixij 
in Alexander. In contrast to Alexander or Galen, Clement’s preference 
for ¢pÒdeixij is not imbedded into a broader interest in formal thinking. 
However, Clement’s three approaches to describing the relation between 
sound demonstration and syllogism show a detailed knowledge of logic 
which he asserts is useful in the context of theological argumentation.
III. The purpose of demonstration
In the end, does Clement expect the methods of logic to defi ne a standard 
in theology? He favours the use of syllogisms insofar as the truth value of 
the premisses qualifi es them as demonstrations, but a certain reluctance 
concerning syllogistic inference is visible in his qualifi cation of forms of 
argumentation by the means of the opposition between truth and opinion. 
Clement is interested in applying logic to theological argumentation and 
at the same time he knows the limits of doing so. Clement distinguishes 
56 Clem., str. VIII 8,1 (84,9-15 F.).
57 This has probably to be understood as “concludent in the specifi c sense”, cf. D.L., vit. VII 
78,5 (401,11f. Marcovich): perantikoˆ dš e„sin e„dikîj oƒ sun£gontej m¾ sullogistikîj.
58 On Stoic Logic cf. S. Bobzien, 5. Logic, III. The Stoics, in: K. Algra/J. Barnes/J. Mans-
feld/M. Schofi eld (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge 
1999, 92-176. Cf. M. Frede, Stoic Epistemology, in: Algra/Barnes/Mansfeld/Schofi eld 
(eds.), The Cambridge History (wie Anm. 58), 295-322.
59 Alex. Aphr., APr. I prooemium (8,19-24 W.): did£skei, Óti prohgoÚmenon œrgon tÁj sul-
logistikÁj p£shj meqÒdou cr¾ tÕn perˆ ¢pode…xewj ¹ge‹sqai lÒgon: kaˆ g¦r ¹ perˆ t¦ 
¥lla e‡dh toà sullogismoà pragmate…a tù filosÒfJ g…netai, kaq' Óson kaˆ tÕ perˆ ™ke…nwn 
dieilhfšnai cr»simon prÕj ¢pÒdeixin kaˆ t¾n toà ¢lhqoàj eÛresin:, translation: Barnes et 
al., Alexander of Aphrodosias (see note 54), 51.
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philosophy and dialectics, which defi ne that culture of education that he 
wants the Christian Gnostic to relate to and to distinguish himself from. 
As Clement does not reject the culture of education in general, his treat-
ment of dialectics has to be subtle. Namely, he uses the distinctions made 
in logic to clarify his own approach to dialectics. 
Besides the treatment in book 8 of the Stromata, he does this in the 
closely related chapters in book 2 of the Stromata60. Here he gives exactly 
the same defi nition of ¢pÒdeixij as in book 8, introducing it as follows: 
“Justifi ed however is only that knowledge that represents the scientifi c 
demonstration of the tradition according to the true philosophy”61. Demon-
stration is again an intellectual procedure that produces certainty or faith. 
More clearly than in the 8th book, demonstration is applied in the context 
of Christian thinking. Christian faith and epistemological certainty, both 
readings of p…stij, explain each other. “For the discourse which consists 
of demonstrations, implants certain faith in the soul of him who follows 
it”62. Christian faith is supported by demonstration. Clement speaks of 
the “highest” form of demonstration and urges the gnostic to be a true 
dialectician. This application to Christian thinking implies that Clement 
takes up cause for demonstrative syllogisms. In the 2nd book, they are again 
contrasted to dialectical syllogisms. “The demonstration which rests on 
opinion is human, and is the result of rhetorical arguments or dialectic 
syllogisms. For the highest demonstration, which we alluded to as scien-
tifi c, produces certainty (p…stij) by the opening up of Scriptures to the 
souls of those who desire to learn; the result of which is knowledge”63. 
Clement applies the steps of demonstration to the reading of Scripture, 
starting with a true proposition, a verse of Scripture, and resulting in a 
true conclusion. 
The fi rst chapters of the 8th book can be read as a commentary on Matt 
7,7f.: “Ask, and it shall be given you, seek, and ye shall fi nd; knock, and 
it shall be opened unto you”64. To explain this highly controversial verse 
Clement invokes and defends the notion of scientifi c investigation. Clement 
points out that there is no fi nding without searching, and no apprehension 
without effort. Driven by his desire to fi nd, the Christian, according to 
Clement, will nevertheless be peaceful in his inquiry, not showing self-love 
60 Clem., str. II 48,1-49,4 (138,15-139,11 F.).
61 Clem., str. II 48,1 (138,17f. F.): pist¾ d{ ¹ gnîsij ¼tij ¨n e‡h ™pisthmonik¾ ¢pÒdeixij tîn 
kat¦ t¾n ¢lhqÁ filosof…an paradidomšnwn.
62 Clem., str. I 33,2 (22,2f. F.): Ð g¦r ¢pÕ tîn ¢pode…xewn lÒgoj ¢kribÁ p…stin ™nt…qhsi tÍ 
yucÍ toà parakoloàntoj.
63 Clem., str. II 49,2-4 (139,3-8 F.): ¹ d{ doxastik¾ ¢pÒdeixij ¢nqrwpik¾ tš ™sti kaˆ prÕj 
tîn _htorikîn ginomšnh ™piceirhm£twn À kaˆ dialektikîn sullogismîn. ¹ g¦r ¢nwt£tw 
¢pÒdeixij, ¿n Ænix£meqa ™pisthmonik»n, p…stin ™nt…qhsi di¦ tÁj tîn grafîn paraqšseèj 
te kaˆ dio…xewj ta‹j tîn manq£nein Ñregomšnwn yuca‹j, ¼tij ¨n e‡h gnîsij.
64 On the relation between Clem., str. V 96,3 to EvThom (NHC II,2-7) 2f. (NHS 5, 52,15-
54,5 Layton) cf. J.-É. Ménard, L’ Évangile selon Thomas, NHS 5, Leiden 1975, 78-80.
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65 Clem., str. VIII 1,3-2,3 (80,10-81,1 F.).
66 Cf. K. Rudolph, Loyalitätskonfl ikte in der Gnosis, in: idem, Gnosis und Spätantike 
Religionsgeschichte, NHMS 42, Leiden/New York/Köln 1996, 213.
67 Pistis Sophia II 83 (NHS 9, 184,11f. Schmidt/Macdermot); II 100 (250,3-6 S./M.); II 
132 (347,15-20 S./M.); EvMar (BG 1) 8,20-22 (NHS 11, 459 Parrott); SJC (Papyrus 
Berolinensis Gnosticus [= P.Berol. 8502]) 80,9f. (NHS 27, 43 Parott) = SJC (NHC III,4) 
70,6f. (NHS 28, 42 Parrot); Papyrus Berolinensis Gnosticus 114,17-115,2 (159 P.); Dial 
(NHC III,5) 128f. (BCNH 29, 66,4; 68,15 Létourneau); Brontê (NHC VI,2) 13 (BCNH 
22, 178,4f. Poirier); OgdEnn (NHC VI,6) 60,10 (NHS 11, 364 Dirkse/Brashler/Par-
rot).
68 Pistis Sophia II 83 (184,10 S./M.), cp. a little later II 83 (185,2-6 S./M.): “Because we 
do not question in the manner in which men of the world question, but we question 
with the knowledge of the height which thou hast given to us, and we question with 
the type of superior questioning which thou hast taught us, that we should question 
therewith.”
69 Pistis Sophia II 83.85f.88.97.100 (189,24f.; 190,3f.; 198,25; 201,13; 234.1f. S./M.) cf. 
II 83.88 (185,13; 202,5 S./M.).
70 Tert., praescr. 8,1 (CChr.SL 1, 193,1-3 Refoulé): uenio itaque ad illum articulum quem 
et nostri praetendunt ad ineundam curiositatem et haeretici inculcant ad importandam 
scrupulositatem [...]. 
71 Iren., haer. II 30,2,26-28 (SC 294, 302 Rousseau/Doutreleau): ad quos stupescunt multi 
insensatorum, quasi plus aliquid ipsa ueritate ab eis possent discere?
72 Tert., praescr. 9,4 (195,9-14 R.): quaerendum est donec inuenias et credendum ubi inue-
neris, et nihil amplius nisi custodiendum quod credidisti [...]. nec requirendum cum id 
inueneris et credideris quod ab eo institutum est, qui non aliud tibi mandat inquirendum 
quam quod instituit.
but loving truth. Receiving understanding by scientifi c proof, he will be 
prudent, considerate, not fond of strife, and free from ambition65.
The various Christian groups invoked Matt 7,7 in order to identify 
themselves with the seekers, or with those who have found66. In the Nag 
Hammadi texts and other Coptic Gnostic writings there are numerous 
references to and quotations of Matt 7,767. In the Pistis Sophia text Mary 
Magdalene appears in the role of the questioner. She inquires with assur-
ance and certainty (¢sf£leia)68, and this phrase occurs several times in 
the text69. According to Irenaeus and Tertullian this style of questioning 
was very persuasive to many people. Tertullian writes: “I come now to the 
verse that our people use as pretext for pursuing their curiosity, and the 
heretics exploit to cultivate misgivings“70. “They bedazzle many unwise 
people, as if one could learn more than the truth from them“71, so Irenaeus. 
Reacting against a group who raise endless questions, Tertullian declares 
that the time of searching lies in the past. “You must seek until you fi nd 
and believe when you have found; and then there is nothing more to do 
than to hold to what you believe”, in the conviction that “no inquiry is 
allowed once you have found and believed what has been taught by him 
who charges us to search for nothing beyond his teaching“72.
It appears, indeed, that the concerns of Tertullian are not altogether 
foreign to Clement. Christians distinguish themselves in that they have 
arrived and have found a dogma. In the introduction to book 8, the em-
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phasis in Matt 7,7 is on fi nding rather than seeking the dogma. Exactly 
this distinguishes the “barbaric” Christians from their contemporaries 
among the philosophers, whose ruminations amount to nothing but empty 
contentless debates, according to Clement73. This reminds us of Justin, 
who, disappointed by his itinerary through the schools of philosophy, 
encountered the old man who showed him a philosophy whose truth was 
grounded in the old tradition and could be built upon74.
Seeking leads the Christian to the goal, according to Clement, but 
this does not release him from further efforts. “The Word does not want 
him who has come to believe to be passive and entirely idle with respect 
to the truth. Indeed it says ‘Seek, and ye shall fi nd’, but it brings seek-
ing to its end in fi nding, excluding only empty trifl ing yet admitting the 
philosophical refl ection“75. If the Gnosis stands for restless searching and 
the Church for ignorance and a false complacency, then Clement belongs 
on the side of Gnosis. At least, he shares their opinion of Christians that 
lack gnostic ambition. He speaks of people who insists that they have 
found the truth and that Christian faith brooks no proof. They avoid any 
examination through fear of being proven wrong. They are in thrall to 
self-deception and achieve a peace of mind that is grounded in illusion. 
According to Clement they are not few76. We meet again the protagonists 
of a plain, unsophisticated form of Christianity. The Authentikos Logos, 
one of the few Gnostic writings that refers to their opponents77 states: 
“However, those who are ignorant don’t seek God”78, and Clement would 
add: much less fi nd him. “If they have faith (and I do not want to speak 
of knowledge) of a kind that can be dissolved by any plausible argument, 
then let it be dissolved“79. 
Clement does not subject the endless questions and nitpickings of the 
Gnostics to the Sceptical critique (as Tertullian might), but rather directs 
the arguments of the Sceptics80 against Tertullian and against the refusal 
of his followers to refl ect upon and thereby strengthen their faith. Ac-
73 Clem., str. I 23,3; I 9,43; I 10,47.
74 Just., dial. 7,1-3 (PTS 47, 82-84 Marcovich).
75 Clem., str. I 51,4 (33,23-26 F.): ¢k…nhton m{n oân prÕj ¢l»qeian kaˆ tù Ônti ¢rgÕn oÙ 
boÚletai e"nai tÕn pisteÚsanta Ð lÒgoj: »zhte‹te« g¦r »kaˆ eØr»sete« lšgei, ¢ll¦ t¾n 
z»thsin e„j eÛresin peraio‹, t¾n ken¾n ™xel£saj fluar…an, ™gkr…nwn d{ t¾n Ñcuroàsan t¾n 
p…stin ¹m‹n qewr…an. Cf. str. VIII 1,2 (80,8 F.).
76 Clem., str. VII 92,5 (65,25-27 F.).
77 Cf. K. Koschorke, Die Polemik der Gnostiker gegen das kirchliche Christentum, NHS 
12, Leiden 1978. 
78 AuthLog (NHC VI,3) 30,4f. (BCNH 2, 31 Ménard), vgl. TractTrip (NHC I,5) 109 (NHS 
22, 288-290 Attridge/Pagels); Iren., haer. II 26,3 (262,68 R./D.).
79 Clem., str. VI 81,1 (472,3f. F.): e„ d{ toiaÚth par' aÙto‹j ™stin ¹ p…stij (oÙ g¦r ¨n gnîsin 
e‡poimi), †na luqÍ piqanolog…v, luq»tw. Cf. Clem., str. VII 92,6 (65,22-31 F.).
80 Cf. the explanation on Scepticism in Clem., str. VIII 15,2-16,3 (89,1-90,6 F.), cf. in detail 
G. Striker, Sceptical Strategies, in: Schofi eld/Myles/Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism 
(see note 11), 54-83.
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cording to Clement, they themselves end by producing strife because they 
abdicate judgment and are not capable of distinguishing true statements 
from false. Taking an anti-sceptical position, Clement insists that we 
should not suspend judgment, just because the false and contradictory 
is diffi cult to distinguish from the true and consistent. Rather, we are 
asked to seek reliable knowledge. We must examine possibilities, and in 
particular, distinguish between appearance and truth. Clement gives the 
following example: if two pieces of fruit are before us, and one of them 
is an imitation made of wax that only looks like a fruit, then we need not 
simply do without fruit, but rather should carefully examine the fruit and 
decide81. Clement thus shows great confi dence that the search for truth 
will result in reliable knowledge. 
Clement speaks of a kind of know-nothing tendency on the part of 
his opponents82, arguing against the disrespect of skills and knowledge 
from agriculture and medicine to geometry. His main argument consists 
of pointing out the necessity of making distinctions83. In this connection 
he mentions heresies84, for which there is a particular need to sort out 
the alternatives. Faith that avoids questions or is disturbed by them is 
shaky and insecure. Dialectics, according to Clement, defends faith against 
heresies as a “bulwark, so that truth cannot be trampled under foot by 
the sophists”85. 
But is dialectics in a position to carry out this task? In the 7th book of 
the Stromata Clement speaks of false teachers, their exegeses, their de-
bates86. These are not the simple Christians who avoid critical discussion, 
but rather those that Clement accuses of attempting to transcend ordinary 
belief. Characterizations against which he has had to defend himself now 
serve to shewer his opponents. He describes them thus: “They do not lay 
down necessary principles as a foundation for the matter, but rather are 
driven by human opinions, then draw from them the necessarily following 
conclusions, and to avoid being refuted they end up sparing with those in 
possession of the true philosophie“87. Drawing conclusions from merely 
agreed-upon assumptions that are not known to be true is the hallmark 
of dialectical syllogism, which according to Clement, is connected to 
strifemongering and is speculative in a way that can be called eristic. By 
81 Clem., str. VII 4 (64,30-34 F.).
82 Clem., str. I 43,1-4 (28,18-29,13 F.); VI 93,1(478,14-19 F.).
83 Clem., str. I 45,4 (30,10-12 F.).
84 Clem., str. I 44,2 (29,23f. F.). 
85 Clem., str. VI 81,4 (472,17f. F.): oŒon qrigkÕj g£r ™sti dialektik», æj m¾ katapate‹sqai 
prÕj tîn sofistîn t¾n ¢l»qeian. cf. str. I 99,4 (63,27-29 F.). 
86 Clem., str. VII 94.96-98.
87 Clem., str. VII 98,2 (69,14-17 F.): aÙt…ka oÙk ¢nagka…aj ¢rc¦j pragm£twn kataballÒmenoi 
dÒxaij te ¢nqrwp…naij kekinhmšnoi, œpeita ¢nagka…wj tšloj ¢kolouqoàn aØto‹j ™kporizÒmenoi, 
diaplhkt…zontai di¦ toÝj ™lšgcouj prÕj toÝj t¾n ¢lhqÁ filosof…an metaceirizomšnouj. Cf. 
str. I 39,3 (26,6f. F.).
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using the term ™ristikÒj88, Clement signals that the distinction between 
demonstration and dialectical syllogism that he developed in the 8th book 
separates him from this group of opponents.
This indicates a different point of view than the one known from the 
Aristotelian Topics. After distinguishing demonstration and dialectical 
syllogism, Aristotle goes further and sets off both from eristic syllogism, 
which are favoured by those who are eager for strife. According to Ar-
istotle: “they only appear to establish a conclusion from premisses that 
seem to be reputable but are not really so”89 Eristic is described as giving 
the impression of a deduction which isn’t one. So strictly speaking, there 
are no eristic syllogisms but only eristic deceptions90. In this light, the 
technical term ‘eristic’ seems unsuited to describe Clement’s opponents. 
Clement appears to confl ate two Aristotelian concepts in order to discredit 
his opponents. Clement seems to be aware of this problem91 and doesn’t 
use the term ‘eristic’ often92.
To defend his line of thought, Clement insists upon strictly separating 
persuasive dialectical arguments from demonstration93. The method of 
demonstration, which results in certainty of faith, serves to defend him 
against unsophisticated as well as over-sophisticated Christians94. Thus in 
Clement, as in Tertullian and others, the allegation of overusing dialectics 
can be employed to impugn the opponent.
In the Stromata we fi nd both criticism and praise for dialectics. Clem-
ent’s treatment, however, is self-consistent. In his critique, he delineates 
the potential of logic to be an empty, sophistical endeavour dealing with 
mere probabilities95, but this does not undercut his conviction that a 
88 Clem., str. I 41,2 (27,10f. F.).
89 Arist., SE 165b9-11 (SCBO, 192 Ross).
90 Clement gives the following example of a sophistical syllogism: “What you say passes 
through your mouth. Which is true. You name a house. Therefore a house passes through 
you mouth. Which is false”. Clem., str. VIII 26,5 (97,4-7 F.).
91 Cf. Clem., str. I 39,3 (26,7f. F.)
92 Cf. Clem., str. I 39,1-4 (25,32-26,14 F.); I 41,2 (27,10f. F.); I 47,2 (31,5-8 F.); V 8,1 
(330,22f. F.); VI 162,2 (515,22-24 F.); VII 4 (71,17 F.); VIII 1,2 (80,8 F.), cf. also str. I 
22,2 (14,23f. F.); V 7,1 (329,25 F.); VIII 11,3 (86,27 F.).
93 Against the interpretation of this verse by J. Helderman, Die Anapausis im Evangelium 
Veritatis. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung des valentinianisch-gnostischen Heilsgutes der 
Ruhe im Evangelium Veritatis und in anderen Schriften der Nag Hammadi-Bibliothek, 
Leiden 1984, 100f.: „Auch Clemens Alexandrinus – der ‚christliche Gnostiker’ hat das 
häretische Verfahren bzw. die Berufung auf das Jesuswort zurückgewiesen“.
94 Clement has therefore been characterized as occupying an intermediate position by Ko-
schorke, Die Polemik (see note 77), 201: “Eine bemerkenswerte Zwitterstellung nimmt 
dabei der ‚kirchliche Gnostiker’ Clem.Al. ein: für häretisches Forschen wehrt er in str. 
I,54,4 das Recht der Berufung auf Mt 7:7 ab, nimmt es aber für sein eigenes, über den 
‚einfachen Glauben’ der Menge hinausgehendes Forschen in Anspruch –, wobei ihm 
jedoch seitens der kirchlichen simpliciores vergleichbares Mißtrauen begegnet wie den 
häretischen Gnostikern“.
95 For example Clem., str. I 39,1-5 (25,30-26,14 F.); I 41,2 (27,10f. F.).
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Christian Gnostic should have training in logic as demonstration is an 
essential tool for providing certainty in faith and thinking96. Clement does 
not see his own use of dialectics as being subject to the fl aws depicted in 
his critical remarks. Throughout the books of the Stromata, his pursuit 
of these distinctions within dialectics defi nes his stand in the controversies 
of his time.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
In Stromata VIII fi nden sich drei Kapitel, in denen Clemens Beweis und dialektischen 
Syllogismus gegenüberstellt. Seine Ausführungen haben Parallelen in der aristotelischen 
Dialektik. Beweiskräftige Schlüsse übertragen die Zuverlässigkeit und Wahrheit der Prä-
misse auf die Schlussfolgerung, sie führen zu zuverlässiger Erkenntnis. Das Bemühen um 
zuverlässige Erkenntnis ist nach Clemens Aufgabe des Theologen. Entsprechend häufi g 
begegnet die dialektische Terminologie, insbesondere in Stromata II und VII. 
 Stromata VIII wird eingeführt als Kommentar zu dem kontrovers interpretierten 
Vers Mt 7,7. Im Unterschied zur nicht-christlichen Philosophie führt nach Clemens 
die christliche Philosophie zum „Finden“, was sie aber nicht des „Suchens“ enthebt. 
Christen, die nach zuverlässiger Erkenntnis streben, sind nach Clemens also gerade 
nicht wie in Tertullians Häretikerbeschreibung diejenigen, die endlos suchen und deren 
Suche zu nichts führt. Vielmehr hält Clemens umgekehrt seinen Gegnern vor, dass sie 
unter den skeptischen Vorbehalt fallen, wenn sie sich in ihrem einfachen Glauben eines 
Urteils bewusst enthalten. 
 Clemens verteidigt eine Ausbildung in Dialektik, gleichzeitig fi nden sich bei Clemens 
logik-kritische Aussagen, in denen Clemens jedoch nicht seine eigene Haltung gegenüber 
der Dialektik zurücknimmt. Er hat hier mit einer zweiten Gruppe von Gegnern zu tun, 
denen Clemens das Argumentieren mit dialektischen Schlüssen zuschreibt, d.h. mit 
zwar gültigen, aber im Gegensatz zu seinen eigenen Beweisen nicht notwendig wahren 
Schlüssen. Diese Schlüsse zieht er in den Bereich eristischer Scheinsyllogismen, womit 
deutlich ist, dass er in der Dialektik entwickelte Unterscheidungen benutzt, um seine 
Position in den Auseinandersetzungen zu bestimmen.
96 Cf. Clem., str. I 177,1f. (109,5-13 F.); VI 80,4 (471,30-33 F.). Further example’s of Clem-
ent’s knowledge in dialectics cf. M. Frede, The Original Notion of Cause, in: Schofi eld/
Myles/Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism (see note 11), 217-248.
